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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Micah M. Haugland appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction, 
wherein the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years 
fixed, for Mr. Haugland's felony conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, 
(hereinafter, DUI). On appeal, Mr. Haugland asserts that the district court erred when it 
denied his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Officers Logsdon and Manning were operating a crosswalk sting operation where 
Officer Manning, a plain clothed officer, would walk back forth across a crosswalk of an 
uncontrolled intersection and Officer Logsdon waited in a patrol to see if any vehicles 
failed to yield to Officer Manning. (12/19/11 Tr., p.8, L.8 - p.9, L.3, p.12, Ls.2-14, p.17, 
L. 16 - p.18, L.14, p.27, L.12 - p.28, L.3) Mr. Haugland was pulled over for failing to 
yield to Officer Manning and he was ultimately arrested for DUI. (12/19/11 Tr., p.21, 
Ls.13-18; R., pp.6-9.) 
Prior to Mr. Haugland's arrest, Officer Logsdon observed Officer Manning step 
into the crosswalk of the intersection. (12/19/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.1-9.) At that moment, 
Officer Logsdon could not see Mr. Haugland's vehicle, and had no knowledge of the 
location of Officer Manning in relationship to the location of Mr. Haugland's vehicle. 
(12/19/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.14-22.) Officer Logsdon testified that Mr. Haugland's vehicle and 
Officer Manning were approximately ten to fifteen feet away from each other when he 
observed Mr. Haugland's vehicle pass over the crosswalk. (12/19/11 Tr., p.26, LS.9-
12.) When asked if Officer Manning had any reaction at the time both Mr. Haugland's 
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vehicle and Officer Manning were in the crosswalk, Officer Logsdon testified that, "I 
could tell that someone was coming before the vehicle entered the crosswalk because 
Officer Manning began to backup." (12/19/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.13-18.) The district court 
made the following factual findings concerning this testimony: 
The officer did say -- and there was a little difference in terminology here 
that I want to clear up. One of the things [the prosecutor] argued, he said 
Officer Manning, quote unquote, had to back up. And the officer didn't say 
he had to back up ... in order to keep from being hit. He said when he 
saw the defendant's vehicle -- apparently when Officer Manning saw the 
defendant's vehicle coming, he did back up, but there was no -- that 
wasn't the term he used in his testimony where he said he had to back up. 
(12/19/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.11-21.) 
Officer Logsdon was also asked if there was "no immediate risk of collision 
during the events that" he witnessed. (12/19/11 Tr., p.22, Ls-23-25.) Officer Logsdon 
then testified, "Not that I recall- a collision with a vehicle?" (12/19/11 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-2.) 
The Officer was then asked, "With the pedestrian, sir." (12/19/11 Tr., p.23, L.3.) The 
Officer replied, "No. Correct." (12/19/11 Tr., p.23, L.4.) 
Mr. Haugland was charged, by Information, with DUI and a felony enhancement. 
(R., pp.33-35.) Mr. Haugland then filed a motion to suppress evidence and argued that 
the relevant statutes did not require Mr. Haugland to yield to Officer Manning and, 
therefore, Officer Logsdon had no legal reason to pull over Mr. Haugland; that motion 
was denied by the district court. (R., pp.38-40; 12/19/11 Tr., p.29, L.4 - p.31, L.2, p.32, 
L.22 - p.34, L.6, p.39, Ls.10-13.) Mr. Haugland conditionally pleaded guilty to a felony 
DUI and preserved the ability to challenge the denial of his suppression motion on 
appeal. (R., pp.63-64.) 1 Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence offive 
1 The written order preserving Mr. Haugland's suppression motion on appeal is currently 
not in the record on appeal. As such, a motion to augment has been filed concurrently 
herewith. 
2 
years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.2 (R., pp.70-76.) Mr. Haugland 
timely appealed. (R., pp.84-87.) 
2 It appears from the Idaho Supreme Court's online data repository, that Mr. Haugland is 
currently on probation. (https:/lwww.idcourts.us/repository/caseNumberSearch.do 
(Blaine County CR-2011-3013).) 
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ISSUE 




The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Officer Logsdon Had Probable Cause 
To Seize Mr. Haugland 
A. Introduction 
Officer Logsdon stopped Mr. Haugland based on his determination that 
Mr. Haugland had violated a traffic law for failing to yield the right of way to Officer 
Manning when he drove through the intersection. Mr. Haugland argued that he did not 
commit a traffic violation because the applicable statute only required him to yield in the 
event there was a risk that he would collide with Officer Manning. Even though Officer 
Logsdon testified that that Mr. Haugland posed no risk of colliding with Officer Manning 
and the district court made a factual finding that Officer Manning did not have to back up 
in order to avoid Mr. Haugland's vehicle, the district court concluded that Mr. Haugland 
did pose a risk to Officer Manning. Mr. Haugland argues that this determination is 
supported by neither the record nor the district court's other factual findings. 
Mr. Haugland also argues that in order to incur liability under the applicable statutes, 
there must be a factual finding concerning the direction, proximity, and speed of the 
pedestrian and the vehicle create a collision risk, and that the record contains no facts 
as to the speed of either Officer Manning or Mr. Haugland. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On suppression questions, our review of probable cause determinations is 
bifurcated." State v. Schmidt, 121 Idaho 381, 382 (Ct. App. 1992). "We defer to the 
lower court's findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence; however, we 
exercise free review over the lower court's determination of whether constitutional 
requirements were satisfied in light of the facts found." Id. "At a suppression hearing 
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the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh 
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Rader, 135 
Idaho 273, 275 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The Idaho Supreme Court utilizes the following framework when interpreting a 
statute: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we 
exercise free review. It must begin with the literal words of the statute; 
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and 
the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, 
this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. A 
statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one 
reasonable construction. 
City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65,69 (2003). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Officer Logsdon Had Probable 
Cause To Seize Mr. Haugland 
Mr. Haugland has liberty interests which are protected by the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution, which provides that "[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated." Further, Mr. Haugland has a similar liberty interest 
under Article I §, 17 of the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 
146 (1998) ("Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. I, § 17 is to protect Idaho 
citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against arbitrary governmental intrusion."). 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and 
implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Rader, 135 Idaho at 275. "The commission of a traffic offense gives police 
probable cause to stop a vehicle." Schmidt, 121 Idaho at 383. "In determining whether 
probable cause existed, our inquiry turns on whether the officer possessed facts that 
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would lead a person of ordinary prudence to entertain an honest belief that the suspect 
has committed a crime." Id. at 382. "An officer may draw reasonable inferences from 
the facts in his possession, and those inferences may be reflective of the officer's 
experience and law enforcement training." /d. at 382-383. However, "[s]uspicion will 
not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell within the broad 
range of what can be described as normal driving behavior." Rader, 135 Idaho at 275. 
In this case, the district court concluded that Mr. Haugland had committed the 
traffic offense of failing to yield to a pedestrian.3 (12/19/11 Tr., p.38, L.23 - p.39, L.13.) 
The relevant section of the applicable statute, I.e. § 49-702, follows: 
When traffic-control signals are not in place or not in operation the driver 
of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping, if need 
be, to yield to a pedestrian crossing the highway within a crosswalk. 
I.C. § 49-702(1) (emphasis added). A "right of way" is defined as follows: 
"Right-of-way" means the right of one (1) vehicle or pedestrian to proceed 
in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian 
approaching under circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to 
give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other. 
I.C. § 49-119(18) (emphasis added). According to the foregoing statutes, a driver of a 
vehicle does not need to yield to a pedestrian crossing an uncontrolled intersection 
unless there is a danger of a collision. It is important to note that I.e. § 49-702(1) does 
not require the driver of the vehicle to stop whenever a pedestrian is in the crosswalk of 
an uncontrolled intersection. In fact, a driver need only slow down to avoid criminal 
liability under I.e. § 49-702(1). That provision is complemented by the definition of a 
"right-of-way" contained in I.e. § 49-119(18), which states that a pedestrian does not 
3 The district court did not expressly state which statue Mr. Haugland violated. 
However, from the district court's discussion of the relevant statutes, it is apparent that 
the district court found that Mr. Haugland violated I.e. § 49-702(1). 
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have the right of way unless the direction, speed, and proximity of both the vehicle and 
pedestrian give rise to the risk of a collision. 
Based on the foregoing statutes, Mr. Haugland argued that there was no traffic 
violation because Officer Logsdon testified that there was no risk of a collision between 
Officer Manning and Mr. Haugland when Mr. Haugland drove through the intersection. 
(12/19/12 Tr., p.30, Ls.5-11, p.30, Ls.21-23, p.32, L.22 - p.33, L.25.) The district court 
employed the following rationale when rejecting this argument: 
The question asked the officer by Mr. Simms was he asked was 
there an immediate risk of collision, I believe, and the officer said no, there 
was no, quote, unquote, immediate risk of collision. 
The statue doesn't use the term, and the defendant has argued if 
there is no immediate hazard, there is no violation. 49 -- or, excuse me, .. 
. 119 ... subparagraph (18), uses the term "Right-of-way ..... 
However, when a pedestrian is coming toward your lane of traffic, it 
does give rise to a danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the 
other when the officer is a lane away or within one lane of the driver of this 
vehicle. He's in the center of the street headed in one direction to pass in 
front of the defendant's vehicle here. The circumstances of direction, 
speed and proximity do give rise to danger of collision unless one grants 
precedence to the other. And under the circumstances here, the 
pedestrian is already in the crosswalk, he's committed and he's moving, 
and it's up to the vehicle driver under that circumstance to stop and yield. 
(12/19/11 Tr., p.38, L.1 - p.39, L.9.) 
There are various reasons why the district court's conclusion that Mr. Haugland 
posed a collision risk to Officer Manning is not supported by the record. Officer 
Logsdon provided the following testimony when asked if there was an immediate risk 
that Mr. Haugland would hit Officer Manning: 
Q. (By Mr. Simms) Officer Logsdon, there was no immediate risk of 
collision during the events that you witnessed, was there? 
A. Not that I recall -- a coliision with a vehicle? 
Q. With the pedestrian, sir. 
A. No. Correct. 
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(12/19/11 Tr., p.22, L.23 - p.23, LA.) It does not matter that Officer Manning was asked 
if there was an immediate risk of collision because the gravamen of Officer Logsdon's 
testimony was that there was no risk that Mr. Haugland was going to hit Officer 
Manning. 
Mr. Haugland also argues that there was no risk of a collision because there 
was over one lane separating Officer Manning and Mr. Haugland when he drove over 
the cross walk.4 (12/19/11 Tr., p.21, L.22 - p.22, L.20; Defendant's Exhibit A.) The 
district court treated the mere proximity between Mr. Haugland and Officer Manning as 
a per se collision risk. (12/19/11 Tr., p.38, L.1 - p.39, L.9.) However, people generally 
drive down roads where pedestrians on adjacent sidewalks are much closer than 
Mr. Haugland was to Officer Manning and do not pose a risk of collision. 
Further, the district court's determination that the mere proximity between Officer 
Manning and Mr. Haugland created a collision risk is in error because there is no 
factual support for the conclusion that Mr. Haugland's speed would cause an accident.5 
Idaho Code 49-119(18) requires a factual determination, in addition to direction and 
proximity, that speed of both the pedestrian and the vehicle will create a risk of collision 
in order for the driver of the vehicle to be required to yield to the pedestrian. Under 
certain circumstances, a vehicle and a pedestrian could be within one lane of each 
other, but based on the relative speeds of the pedestrian and vehicle there could be no 
4 The district court concluded that a risk of collision existed when Officer Manning was 
"a lane away or within one lane of" Mr. Haugland's vehicle. (12/19/11 Tr., p.38, L.23 -
p.39, L.9.) The record reflects that there was a more than an entire lane of traffic 
between Officer Manning and Mr. Haugland. (12/19/11 Tr., p.21, L.22 - p.22, L.20; 
Defendant's Exhibit A.) 
5 Mr. Haugland does not contest that Mr. Haugland was headed in the direction of 
Officer Manning before he drove over the cross walk. (12/19/11 Tr., p.18, L.19 - p.21, 
L.2.) However, based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Logsdon testified that 
there was no risk of collision. (12/19/11 Tr., p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.4.) 
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risk of collision. In this case, Officer Logsdon testified that he did not know the speed 
of Mr. Haugland's vehicle because the angle of his vehicle in relation to Mr. Haugland's 
prevented his radar from detecting the speed of Mr. Haugland's vehicle. (12/19/11 
Tr., p.25, Ls.9-19.) There was no testimony about the speed at which Officer Manning 
was walking. Officer Dodgson never testified that based on his visual observations of 
both Mr. Haugland's speed and Officer Manning's speed that it appeared they would 
collide.6 The only testimony in the record generally relating Mr. Haugland' speed to 
Officer Manning's was from Officer Logsdon when he testified that there was no risk of 
a collision. As such, the mere fact that there was over one car length between Officer 
Manning and Mr. Haugland's vehicle when Mr. Haugland drove over the crosswalk 
does not support the district court's conclusion that there was a risk of a collision, as 
there was no testimony or other evidence supporting that conclusion. 
Additionally, the fact that Officer Manning backed up cannot be used to argue 
that Mr. Haugland posed a collision risk. (12/19/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.11-21.) As stated 
above, the district court made a factual finding that there was no evidence indicating 
that Officer Manning had to move out of Mr. Haugland's way. (12/19/11 Tr., p.37, 
Ls.11-21.) Even though Officer Manning backed up, Officer Logsdon did not know 
exactly why because he had no way of communicating with Officer Manning and 
Officer Manning did not signal or otherwise communicate with Officer Logsdon as 
Mr. Haugland approached and drove through the crosswalk. (12/19/11 Tr., p.26, L.19 
6 The only reference to the speed of Mr. Haugland's vehicle was Officer Logsdon's 
testimony that Mr. Haugland did not slow down as he approached the crosswalk. 
(12/19/11 Tr., p.25. Ls.5-7.) However, this testimony does not describe the relative 
speeds of Mr. Haugland and Officer Manning. 
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- p.27, L.4.) As such, the testimony that Officer Manning backed up does not support 
the conclusion the Mr. Haugland posed a collision risk. 
Finally, if it is determined that Mr. Haugland did not pose a collision risk and, 
therefore, there was no probable cause for Officer Logsdon to stop him, the seizure of 
Mr. Haugland was illegal. Thus, all of the incriminating evidence which was obtained 
subsequent to the illegal seizure should be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine. "If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be 
excluded as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Van Dome, 139 Idaho 961, 963 
(Ct. App. 2004) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). This includes 
all of the evidence used to establish that Mr. Haugland was driving under the influence 
of alcohol. 
In sum, in order for a pedestrian to have the right of way in relationship to a 
vehicle in an uncontrolled intersection, the direction, speed, and proximity of the 
pedestrian and vehicle must pose a risk of collision. It might be a commonly accepted 
belief that the driver of a vehicle must stop whenever s/he is approaching a pedestrian 
utilizing a crosswalk. However, that is not the law in Idaho. In this case, Mr. Haugland 
exhibited normal driving behavior as Officer Logsdon testified that there was no risk of 
collision. There was over one car lane between Mr. Haugland and Officer Manning as 
Mr. Haugland drove over the cross walk, and there is no evidence indicating that 
the speeds of Officer Manning and Mr. Haugland created a risk of collision. As such, 
there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify Officer Logsdon's stop of 
Mr. Haugland as he did not commit a traffic violation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Haugland respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of December, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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